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1Abstract
The dynamics of a welfare maximizing, heterogeneous agent, one sector op-
timal Ramsey model is analyzed assuming two agents, each with a distinct dis-
count factor and log utility. Production is Cobb-Douglas. Explicit time varying
policy functions are derived, one for each period. A Twisted Turnpike Property
and eventually monotone dynamics are demonstrated to govern the evolution of
the economy’s aggregate capital stock.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C61, D51, D90, O41.
Key Words: Optimal Growth, Pareto Optimality, Symmetry, Twisted Turn-
pike Theorem, Monotone Dynamics.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The object of this paper is to modify the canonical representative agent dis-
counted optimal growth model with log utility and Cobb-Douglas production
function to include many households, each with a diﬀerent discount factor. The
planner’s welfare function is taken to be a weighted function of the underlying
households’ intertemporal utility functions. The weights are predetermined and
ﬁxed for all time as the planner solves the optimization problem. This maxi-
mization problem is a well-known way to compute a particular Pareto optimal
allocation for a many agent Ramsey model.1 By varying the welfare weights it
is possible to trace out the economy’s utility possibility frontier and ﬁnd all the
Pareto optimal allocations. This procedure also yields a proof of the existence
of a competitive equilibrium by combining the welfare theorems with Negishi’s
(1960) existence argument.
The qualitative properties of the welfare maximization problem and the de-
tailed development of the Negishi argument can be found for the general one-
sector model in the papers by Duran and Le Van (2003) and Le Van and Vailakis
(2003). The latter authors prove that the optimal capital sequence is conver-
gent, but not necessarily monotonic, in a general one-sector framework. My
example supplements their results by showing the optimal paths starting from
diﬀerent initial stocks come together in the limit. Mitra (1979) calls this the
optimal capital sequences’ twisted turnpike property. A second contribution is
to show that each optimal capital sequence starting from an arbitrary initial
capital stock is eventually monotonic.
3That eventual monotonicity of the optimal capital sequence is the best pos-
sible convergence property reﬂects a point made by Le Van and Vailakis (2003).
Consider the case where both agents have positive welfare weights, yet the econ-
omy starts oﬀ with the stationary optimal capital stock for the representative
agent economy when the welfare weight is concentrated entirely on the most
patient agent. It turns out in the Le Van and Vailakis paper that this capital
stock is the attractor for the long-run optimal sequence and that sequence is not
a constant one.2 In fact, the ﬁrst period’s capital stock must be smaller than the
initial stock in this situation. Put diﬀerently, this starting stock is not a steady
state for the heterogeneous agent optimum growth model even though it is the
limit point of the optimal accumulation program. This fact is also easily proven
in the example given the solution’s explicit formulas in terms of the economy’s
primitive taste and technology parameters.
The two-agent model is setup in Section 3 following a review of the repre-
sentative agent example in Section 2. The basic two-agent welfare optimization
problem is transformed to a representative agent problem with a time varying
discount factor in Section 3. The Twisted Turnpike result also appears there
along with a demonstration based on the formal properties of the policy function
sequences constructed in Section 4. Section 5 develops the qualitative dynam-
ics of the model including results on the optimal path’s eventual monotonicity
property. Concluding comments appear in Section 6.
42 The Representative Agent Example
Frank Ramsey’s (1928) seminal article on optimal capital accumulation con-
centrated on a single planner’s inﬁnite horizon optimization problem. Mod-
ern economic theorists interpret this planning problem’s solution as a perfect
foresight competitive equilibrium for an economy with a representative agent
whose preferences coincide with the planner’s preferences over future consump-
tion streams.3
The logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production economy is an important
example of Ramsey’s one-sector optimal growth problem. Let consumption and







by choice of {ct,x t}
∞
t=1 subject to the constraints
ct +xt ≤ Lx
ρ
t−1, for t =1 ,2,...
and ct,x t ≥ 0 for all t with x0 ≤ k the given initial capital stock. Here 0 <
δ,ρ < 1 are this economy’s deep taste and technology parameters; L is a factor
which reﬂects the quantity of ﬁxed labor. For the representative agent case
L =1and for the case of two agents supplying identical labor services analyzed
below L =2 1−ρ as the underlying production function in capital and labor is
taken to be Cobb-Douglas.
5This Ramsey problem is explicitly solved by a variety of methods.4 The
solution is described by the consumption policy function H(k)=( 1− δρ)Lkρ
and the capital policy function h(k)=δρLkρ. At each date, the policy functions
tell the decision maker how much to consume and how much to save given the
current level of the capital stock, k. The optimal decision taken at any date
depends only upon the amount of capital the planner starts the period with and
not on the particular moment in calender time. This is the time consistency
property.
The optimal capital and consumption sequences are computed by iterating
the policy functions. Carrying out that iteration leads to the explicit solution





where k0(k)=k is the given initial capital stock.
The optimal capital sequence is monotonic and converges to the unique
positive ﬁxed point of the capital policy function. That ﬁxed point, k(δ),
is called the modiﬁed golden-rule level of capital and satisﬁes the equation




If the positive initial capital is below the modiﬁed golden-rule, then the econ-
omy accumulates capital and the sequence of optimal capital stocks increases
6and converges to the modiﬁed golden-rule capital stock. Similarly, the optimal
capital stocks decrease and converge to the modiﬁed golden-rule when the start-
ing stock is larger than the positive ﬁxed point. If the initial capital happens to
equal the modiﬁed golden-rule stocks, then it will be optimal to maintain those





The corresponding consumption sequence is also monotonic since the con-
sumption policy function is increasing in capital. The resulting consumption
sequence converges to the modiﬁed golden-rule consumption level deﬁned by
c(δ)=( 1−δρ)(k(δ))
ρ .
The convergence of the optimal capital and consumption sequences is known
as the turnpike theorem. Finally, note that the turnpike property implies that
| kt(k)−kt(k0) |→ 0 as t →∞for nonzero initial conditions k 6= k0.T h a ti s ,t h e
optimal capital sequences “come together” as t tends to inﬁnity. This obtains
in the two agent example developed below and the optimal capital sequence is
shown to be eventually monotonic.
73 A Two Agent Ramsey Model Example
Assume for simplicity that there are only two households, denoted by h =





t .H e r e {ch
t }∞
t=1 is a given
(nonnegative) consumption sequence and 0 <δ h < 1 is the agent’s discount
factor and δ2 <δ 1.L e tλ ≥ 0 denote the welfare weight assigned to agent 1 and
(1− λ) the welfare weight assigned to the second agent. Assume further that
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 until otherwise noted. The cases where λ equals zero or one reduce to























t +kt ≤ Lk
ρ
t−1,for t =1 ,2,...
and k0 ≤ k,w h e r ek>0 is given, 1 >δ 1 >δ 2 > 0,a n dL =2 1−ρ.T h e
parameter ρ satisﬁes 0 <ρ<1. The parameter L is the labor input to the
production process. Note that both households inelastically supply one unit
of identical labor services at each time to a Cobb-Douglas production function
F( ,k)= 1−ρkρ with Lkρ = F(2,k).


















Deﬁne aggregate consumption at time t as ct with c1
t +c2
t = ct. The distribution
of aggregate consumption within each period can be separated from the problem
of calculating the optimal aggregate consumption over time by solving in every









by choice of nonnegative consumption levels c1
t and c2





where λ is given and 0 <λ<1. The function u(t,λ,ct) is this program’s value














Using the constraint, it is easy to show that each agent’s optimal consumption



































These equations yield an interesting result. Notice that (δ2/δ1)










provided the aggregate consumption path is bounded away from zero along a
welfare maximizing path. This will hold as long as the initial capital stocks
are positive. Hence, the ﬁrst household emerges as the dominant consumer;
its consumption approaches one hundred percent of the economy’s aggregate
consumption and the second household’s consumption shrinks towards zero.5
The calculation of each agent’s consumption share yields the explicit form









































10From the viewpoint of intertertemporal maximization, a sequence {ct,k t−1}∞
t=1







by choice of nonnegative sequences {ct,k t−1}∞
t=1 subject to
ct + kt ≤ Lk
ρ
t−1,f o rt =1 ,2,...
and k0 ≤ k,w i t hk>0 given. The information stored in the value function u is
suﬃcient to decompose the aggregate consumption into the optimal consump-
tion allocations for each agent given the preassigned welfare weights.
The constant γt deﬁned at each time does not depend on the aggregate
consumption’s level or how it is allocated across households. Hence, the {γt}
have no inﬂuence on the determination of the optimal aggregate consumption or
capital accumulation paths and can be neglected when calculating the welfare
maximizing optimal program. So, the welfare maximization problem is solved
if and only if the Ramsey problem with a time variable discount factor deﬁned






11by choice of nonnegative sequences {ct,k t−1}∞
t=1 subject to
ct + kt ≤ Lk
ρ
t−1 for t =1 ,2,...
and k0 ≤ k,w i t hk>0 given. Here the planner’s discount factor at time t,f o c a l










The dependence of ∆t o nt h ec h o i c eo ft h ew e l f a r ew e i g h tλ is suppressed
in this notation. This time-varying discount factor is clearly the weighted
average of the two agents’ discount factors where the weights are given by
the preassigned welfare weights. Problem P(y,∆,L) is an example of the
time varying discounted optimal growth model studied by Mitra (1979).The se-
quence ∆ ≡{∆t}∞




t=1 for h =1 ,2. This implies that the optimal welfare maximizing path
of consumption is not time consistent in the manner deﬁned by Strotz (1955), in
contrast to the representative agent model discussed above. A direct argument
supporting this conclusion is found in Section 4.
The main result is:






capital sequences starting from the endowments y and y#, respectively, then
¯ ¯kt (y) −kt
¡
y#¢¯ ¯ → 0 as t →∞ .
The welfare optimization problem P(y,∆,L) is explicitly solved, and the




∆tρt−j,for j =1 ,2,... .











for j =1 ,2,... .




















where y = Lkρ is the output of goods available at time 1 given the initial stocks
k.7
Now suppose that k# is any other initial capital stock, y# = L(k#)ρ and












































13As 0 <ρ<1, this last equation implies lnzt → 0 as t →∞and hence zt → 1
as t →∞ . In particular, this means that
¯ ¯kt (y) −kt
¡
y#¢¯ ¯ → 0 as t →∞ .P u t
diﬀerently, the optimal capital accumulation sequences starting from diﬀerent
initial capital stocks converge to each other, or come together, in the limit. The
optimal capital sequence exhibits the twisted turnpike property.
There is a feasible path of capital accumulation in which aggregate con-
sumption is stationary, over time as is the capital stock, which also satisﬁes the
condition δ1ρL¯ kρ−1 =1 . This last equation is the steady state capital stock for
the Ramsey optimal growth model when λ =1and c2
t =0– the case where the
model collapses to a single agent problem with the ﬁrst agent’s welfare receiving
all the planner’s weight in the objective. One might think that the stocks ¯ k so
deﬁned would attract, in the limit, the economy’s aggregate capital stocks when
both agents have positive welfare weights. After all, agent 2’s consumption con-
verges to zero as time unfolds, so perhaps it is possible that ¯ k is the limiting
capital stock for those nontrivial welfare weights. This turns out to be true,
but the reason is very subtle. The convergence of the optimal capital sequences
along the twisted turnpike to ¯ k is true, but that stock is not itself a steady
state. This is a fundamental property of the many agent Ramsey model and it
shows one way in which the many agent problem diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the
representative agent model. The fact ¯ k is not a stationary equilibrium stock is a
consequence of a general result due to Le Van and Vailakis (2003), but is easily
shown for my example. Their theorem states that the constant path deﬁned by
¯ k = kt is not an optimal path from initial stocks k0 = ¯ k and hence, it is not a
14stationary equilibrium. I give an independent proof of this fact to illustrate one
beneﬁt derived from knowing the example’s explicit solution.
Proposition 1. ¯ k is not a steady state for the Welfare Optimization Prob-
lem P(y,∆,L).
Proof. It is shown in Section 4 that this problem is solved by calculating a
sequence of policy functions, one for each period of time. The general form of








where yt is the output available at the start of period t. Iterating from time








in period 1. Set y = L¯ kρ; a simple calculation shows k1 < ¯ k. Hence, ¯ k is not a
steady state for P(y,∆,L).8
Le Van and Vailakis’ Theorem shows something more: the optimal capital
sequence initiated at ¯ k converges to it in the long-run even though it is not a
constant sequence.9 In this case, {kt (¯ y)} is not monotonic since k1 (¯ y) < ¯ k.T h e
twisted turnpike property implies all optimal capital sequences converge
to the stock ¯ k as time tends to inﬁnity. In particular, this implies that if the
economy starts with the stocks ¯ k, then it is optimal for the planner to devi-
ate from those stocks and only return to them asymptotically. The resulting
15optimal capital sequence may not be monotonic, although it turns out to be
eventually monotonic.10 In part, this reﬂects the fact that the households enjoy
time varying consumption along their optimal path. The aggregate consump-
tion levels change over time, but the ﬁrst household emerges as the dominant
consumer in the limit.
4 The Symmetry Solution
This section details the symmetry solution to the Welfare Optimization Prob-
lem, the derivation of a sequence of Bellman equations of optimality, and the
calculations giving rise to (3). Boyd’s (1986, 1990) symmetry technique under-
lies the calculations that support the following results. Also, see Kamihigashi
(2008) for a general treatment of nonstationary deterministic dynamic programs
of which this model is one example. A symmetry is a one-to-one mapping be-
tween feasible sets for the problems P(y,∆,L) and P(y,∆,1) in such a manner







in one problem, say P(y,∆,1), then its image under the symmetry
mapping preserves that preference order in the other problem, P(y,∆,L).
Let J (y|∆,L) be the value function for problem P(y,∆,L)and let J (y|∆,1)





t=2,w h e r eS is the corresponding shift operator (also known as the
backward shift operator). Symmetries mapping feasible (and optimal) solutions
for problem P(y,∆,1) to P(y,∆,L) underlie the computations supporting the
16Twisted Turnpike result.
Lemma 1. The symmetry S(ct,k t)=eσt (ct,k t) maps P(y,∆,1) to
P(y,∆,L). This mapping is 1 − 1 a n do n t of o re a c hL>0.H e r e
σt =   + ρ+  ρ2 +···+ ρt−1,
  =l n L.
Proof. Suppose {ct,x t} is a feasible program for problem P(y,∆,1).Ar o u t i n e
computation shows the program deﬁned by
(c∗
t,x ∗
t)=eσt (ct,x t), t =1 ,2,...,
is feasible for problem P(y,∆,L). The planner’s discounted utility in the ﬁrst
problem is
P∞
t=1 ∆t lnct and it is
P∞
t=1∆t lnc∗

















t−1 (h =1 ,2). Hence, {ct,x t} is at least as preferred as the
feasible program {¯ ct, ¯ xt} for problem P(y,∆,1) if and only if the transformed
sequences have the property {c∗
t,x ∗




17Corollary 2. The corresponding value functions are related as follows:




The symmetry S(•) did not act on the endowment, y.T h e s y m m e t r y
T deﬁned next maps P(y,∆,1) to P(θy,∆,1) for some positive constant θ.
Formally, given the feasible sequence {ct,x t} for P(y,∆,1),l e t
T(c t,x t)=eτt (c t,x t),
where τt = ρτt−1 and τ1 =l nθ. Then, τt = ρt−1 lnθ; follow the same line of
reasoning as in Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 to obtain:
Lemma 3.













Commentary: The trick here is to let ¯ y =1and for y 6=1set θ¯ y = y.T h a t
is: θ = y.T h e n
lnθ +ln¯ y =l n y,so,
lnθ =l n y.
Restating Lemma 3:
18Lemma 3*.









4.1 Period 1 Policy Functions

































Combining and solving for the ﬁrst-period’s optimal consumption and capital,













19The Le Van — Valiakis (2003) result that ¯ k ≡ (δ1ρ)
1
1−ρ is NOT a steady state
follows. This result also uses the symmetry structure to prove it for the case
L =1and then know it can be mapped to the case L =2 1−ρ. This result also
depends crucially on 1 >λ>0.














¢ρ 6= ¯ k.
4.2 Policy Functions for t ≥ 2.
Bellman equations capturing the Principle of Optimality are expressed for
each time t, with focal date time 0:11
J (y|∆,1) = max
0≤c≤y
{∆1 lnc + J ((y − c)
ρ |S∆,1)},















































































































< 1 for each t.





















The Twisted Turnpike property follows.













21This means that the optimal policies at each time t depend on calendar time –
this is the manifestation of the time inconsistency,o r ,t h eStrotz eﬀect.
Everything is proven for L =1 . Use the symmetry maps to ﬁnd the L =2 1−ρ
optimum.
5 The Convergence Theorem
The Twisted Turnpike property is a sweeping characterization of optimal so-
lutions starting from diﬀerent initial conditions. It does not fully exploit the
information contained in the sequence of policy functions derived in the sym-
metry procedure. The following Convergence Theorem provides additional
qualitative properties of each optimal path and reﬁnes the Twisted Turnpike
property. The Convergence Theorem implies all sequences of optimal capital
stocks converge to ¯ k independently of the initial conditions. The Convergence
Theorem embodies the same conclusions as reached by Le Van and Vailakis
(2003, Propositions 4 and 7). The policy function based proof, exploiting all
available information, is considerably shorter, and more elementary, than theirs
which considers a broader class of utility and production functions. The basic
logic of the argument is analogous to one pursued by Becker and Foias (1987)
in a diﬀerent heterogeneous agent model.
Theorem 2: Convergence. If {kt (y)} is the optimal capital sequence for
the problem P(y,∆,1),t h e n
lim
t→∞kt (y)=¯ k. (4)
22Moreover, the sequence {kt (y)} is eventually monotonic.




as t →∞implies the Twisted Turnpike property: |kt (y) − kt
¡
y#¢
| → 0.T h e
Convergence Theorem contains more information on the mode of convergence
to ¯ k and reﬁnes the interpretation of “all optimal paths coming together.”
The Convergence Theorem’s proof follows from a series of lemmas developed
below that are constructed on the basis of properties enjoyed by the policy
functions. The results are demonstrated for the case L =1 ; by symmetry the
qualitative results carry over to the case L =2 1−ρ.N o t et h a ti ti sc o n v e n i e n tt o
let the initial capital stock be k = f−1 (y), y = f(k)=kρ. Denote the optimal
sequence by {kt−1}
∞
































Optimal capital sequences are computed by the recursion: kt = θ
λ
t (kt−1) for






23It will be convenient to deﬁne g(k)=δ2ρkρ = θ
0
t(k) and h(k)=δ1ρkρ = θ
1
t(k)
and observe that h(k) ≥ g(k) with equality when k =0as δ1 >δ 2.
When the welfare weights are concentrated on one agent alone (λ =1or
λ =0 ), the corresponding policy function sequences are constant sequences for
each k. In addition, each of the functions g and h has a unique positive ﬁxed
point. Clearly ¯ k = h
¡¯ k
¢
and there is a unique k > 0 such that k = g(k).
Evidently, k < ¯ k.M o r e o v e r , k>¯ k implies h(k) >kand 0 <k<¯ k implies
k<h (k). A similar property holds for g and k. Each element of the sequence
of policy functions when 0 <λ<1 also has a positive ﬁxed point and related
inequalities as seen in the next lemma.
Policy functions have a number of important properties expressed in the
following list. The indexing of the policy function at time t by the weight λ is
suppressed below to ease notation when the meaning is clear.
Lemma 9. For each given t :
A. θt(0) = 0, θ
0
t(k) > 0, θ
00
t (k) < 0, θ
0
t(k) → +∞ as k → 0,k>0,a n dt h e r ei s
au n i q u ek(t) > 0 such that
θt(k(t)) = k(t). (8)
B. If k>k (t), then θt(k) <k ; if k<k (t),t h e nθt(k) >k .
The proof is omitted as it is an easy consequence of the assumed properties
of the production function. Suppose k = ¯ k,t h e n¯ k>k (1).H e n c e , a l o n g a n






< ¯ k,a sp r o m i s e d
24earlier.
The next results list properties of sequences of policy functions. The ﬁrst is
the crucial Fence Property.
Proposition 2. For each t,a n df o re a c hλ,0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,a n df o re a c hk,
g(k) ≤ θt(k) ≤ h(k), with strict inequality if k>0. (9)
Proof. The Proposition is valid if either λ =0or λ =1 .A s s u m e0 <λ<1.
The result follows by showing θt(k) − h(k) ≤ 0 and θt(k) − g(k) ≥ 0 with













− δ2ρ ≡ G is found by computing:
G =1 −δ2ρ −
λδ
t−1






































































































as (δ1 − δ2) > 0.





− δ1ρ<0 and θt(k) − h(k) ≤ 0.
Assume that 0 <λ<1 in the sequel unless expressly noted other-
wise.
One immediate application of the Lemma 9B and Proposition 2 is the ob-
servation:
k <k (t) < ¯ k for each t. (10)
That is, the sequence of ﬁxed points {k(t)} derived from the policy function
sequence inherits the Fence Property in the form of inequalities given in (10).
These relations play an important role in proving the eventual monotonicity of
the optimal capital sequence.




< ¯ k, as promised earlier in Proposition 1.
The following results apply to sequences of policy functions, {θt},a n dt h e
optimal capital sequence, {kt−1} with kt = θt (kt−1) and k0 = k.
Lemma 10. The sequence of policy functions {θt} converges pointwise to
h. That is, for each k>0
lim
t→∞θt (k)=h(k). (11)










































Fix b, 0 <b<+∞.F o re a c ht,s e t
Mt =s u p
k∈[0,b]
|θt (k) − h(k)|.
Clearly f(k)=kρ increasing in k implies
Mt = bρ







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ → 0 as t →∞ .
This proves θt → h uniformly on each non-empty compact interval.
The upper limit b used to deﬁne a particular compact interval [0,b] may be
chosen as the maximum sustainable stock, but this interpretation is not required
for the lemma’s validity. Evidently the choice b =1is the maximum sustain-
able stock for the speciﬁcation f(k)=kρ. Hence, the policy function sequence
converges to h uniformly on any compact interval containing the maximum sus-
27tainable stock. As typical of optimal growth models, the optimal accumulation
sequence will eventually reside in that particular compact interval.
Lemma 10 tells us that the function h is well-approximated by the sequence
of policy functions {θt} even though h is NOT a policy function when 0 <λ<
1. The uniform convergence property suggests that the long-run qualitative
properties of the aggregate capital stock should follow from the monotonicity
properties of optimal paths when λ =1and h is the optimal policy function. In
this sense, it should not be a surprise that monotonicity over all time periods
might fail for ﬁnitely many periods when 0 <λ<1.O v e ras u ﬃciently long time
period agent 1 emerges as the dominant household and the welfare problem’s
solution emulates the case where ALL the welfare weight is placed on that
person. The Convergence Theorem formalizes this intuition and is modeled by
way of the following lemmas and corollaries.
Corollary 11. If the optimal capital sequence {kt−1} has a limit, k∗ > 0,
then k∗ = ¯ k.
Proof.
Suppose kt−1 → k∗ > 0. Then, Lemma 10 implies θt (kt−1)=kt → h(k∗)=
k∗ by Ash (1970, Problem 4, p. 133). But h(k∗)=k∗ > 0 if and only if k∗ = ¯ k.
The next result based on the Fence Property says there is a time such that
kt−1 ≥ k. Its proof turns out to imply the optimal capital sequence cannot
converge to zero.
Lemma 12. Given the optimal capital sequence {kt−1},t h e r ei saﬁnite
28time T such that kT−1 ≥ k.
Proof.
Step I. Suppose there is a time T such that
kT−1 <kand kT <k T−1 <kimplies kT+1 <k T.
Notice k(T +1)=θT+1 (k(T +1 ) )>k= g(k) by the Fence Property (10) and
kT <k<k (T +1 ) . Hence, by Lemma 9B:
kT+1 = θT+1 (kT) >k T,
contradicting the assumption kT+1 <k T.H e n c e ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
kT−1 <kand kT <k T−1 <kimplies kT+1 ≥ kT.
Step II. Assume that kt <kfor all t.T h e n k ≥ kt+1 and k ≥ kt by the
assumed condition. As kt−1 <k ,e i t h e rkt <k t−1,o rkt ≥ kt−1 hold as well.
In the ﬁrst alternative, Step I implies kt+1 ≥ kt . In the second alternative
kt−1 ≤ kt <kimplies kt <k<k (t +1 )by (10). Hence kt+1 >k t as well.
Hence, kt+1 ≥ kt obtains in either situation.
The Fence Property (10) once again yields : k(t +2)>k>k t+1,s okt+2 =
θt+2 (kt+1) >k t+1.H e n c e , kt+2 >k t+1 and k ≥ kt+2 (by assumption). The
previous paragraph’s argument can be repeated starting from any t, in particular
29at t =1 , to yield:
k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ···≤ k.
Thus, the sequence {kt−1} is bounded above by k and it is eventually non-
decreasing.12 Therefore, the limit of this sequence exists, is smaller than or
equal to k, and must be positive. Corollary 11 implies the limit should be ¯ k,
which is larger than k, which is impossible. Therefore, there must exist some
T, 0 <T<+∞ such that kT−1 ≥ k.
The proof of Lemma 12 shows kt−1 9 0 as t →∞ .I fkt−1 → 0, then there is
at i m eT such that kt <kfor all t ≥ T. But then repeating the argument in Step
II of Lemma 12 from time T onwards shows {kt−1} is eventually nondecreasing
and convergent to ¯ k, which is impossible. Thus,
Corollary 13. {kt−1} optimal implies limsupt→∞ kt > 0.
The Fence Property (10) tells us that if kt > ¯ k,t h e nk(t +1 )< ¯ k<k t,s o
θt+1 (kt)=kt+1 <k t. There are two possibilities: either kt+1 > ¯ k or kt+1 ≤ ¯ k.
The next result addresses the case where kt > ¯ k for all but a ﬁnite number of
periods.
Lemma 14. Let {kt−1} be the optimal capital sequence and suppose there is
a T such that kt > ¯ k for all t ≥ T. Then limt→∞ kt−1 = ¯ k and the convergence
is eventually monotonic. In particular,
kT >k T+1 > ···> ¯ k. (14)
30Proof.
Repeated application of the Fence Property (10) and Lemma 9B yields (14).
Hence, the sequence {kt−1} is eventually decreasing and bounded from below
by ¯ k.T h u s ,kt−1 → ¯ k by Corollary 11.
The next result is concerned with situations in which there is a ﬁrst time in
which kt ≤ ¯ k. This can arise either at the start, t =1 ,o ra ts o m eﬁnite date
T in the future. One quick application of Lemma 15, in combination with the
previous result, is that T =1in Lemma 14.
Lemma 15. Let {kt−1} be the optimal capital sequence and suppose there
is a T such that kT ≤ ¯ k. Then kt ≤ ¯ k for all t ≥ T.
Proof.
Let T be the ﬁrst time kT ≤ ¯ k. The Fence Property (10) insures k(T+1) < ¯ k.
Then either case (A) or (B) occurs, where
Case (A) kT ≤ k(T +1)< ¯ k, or
Case (B) k(T +1)<k T < ¯ k.
In Case (A) Lemma 9B implies θT+1 (kT)=kT+1 ≥ kT with equality if and
only if k(T +1)=kT.M o r e o v e r ,θT+1 increasing implies
kT+1 = θT+1 (kT) ≤ θT+1(k(T +1 ) )=k(T +1)< ¯ k.
So, kT+1 < ¯ k.
31In Case (B), Lemma 9B, once again, implies θT+1(kT)=kT+1 <k T < ¯ k.
Therefore, kT+1 < ¯ k holds in either case. Repeat the argument at T +2 ,a n d
so on. The conclusion follows.
The last step in proving the Convergence Theorem is to show that once
the optimal capital stock falls below ¯ k it yields a monotonically nondecreasing
capital sequence thereafter.
Lemma 16. Let {kt−1} be the optimal capital sequence and suppose there
is a T such that kT ≤ ¯ k. Then
kT ≤ kT+1 ≤ ···≤ ¯ k. (15)
Hence, the optimal capital sequence is eventually nondecreasing and converges
to ¯ k.
Proof.
Simplify notation in the proof by dropping the T notation and understand
the argument applies for all t taken suﬃciently large. The previous lemma
implies that once kt ≤ ¯ k then kt+1 ≤ ¯ k,kt+2 ≤ ¯ k, and so on.
Either
kt−1 <k t <k t+1 < ···< ¯ k, (16)
or there is a ﬁrst time, t such that
kt−1 <k t and kt+1 ≤ kt. (17)
32Suppose that the optimal capital sequence satisﬁes (17). Now consider
θt+1 (kt)=kt+1. There are two possibilities:
Case (A) kt ≥ k(t +1 ) ;
Case (B) kt <k(t +1 ).
Start with Case (B) where θt+1(kt)=kt+1 >k t holds by Lemma 9B as kt <
k(t +1) . This violates the assumed satisfaction of inequality (17). Therefore,
C a s e( A )m u s th o l d .
Assume now Case (A) obtains and kt+1 ≤ kt from (17). Thus, kt+1 =
θt+1 (kt) ≤ kt by assumption.
Case (A) has two subcases analogous to those deﬁning Cases (A) and (B).
Subcase (a) kt+1 ≥ k(t +2 );
Subcase (b) kt+1 <k(t +2 ).
If subcase (b) occurs, then kt+2 >k t+1 holds as θt+2(kt+1) >k t+1 by Lemma
9B.
Suppose Subcase (a) occurs. Then either
kt+2 ≤ kt+1 ≤ kt or kt+2 >k t+1.
In this situation, new subcases analogous to (a) and (b) arise for kt+2 taking
the place of kt+1 and k(t +3)in place of k(t +2) . In these situations we once
33again have two possibilities:
kt+3 ≤ kt+2 ≤ kt+1 ≤ kt, or
kt+3 >k t+2 >k t+1.
These alternatives are also the only ones that can arise whenever Subcase (b)
occurs. Thus, we may continue in this manner to produce the alternatives:
¯ k ≥ kt ≥ kt+1 ≥ ···, or
kt+1 <k t+2 < ···< ¯ k.
In the ﬁrst situation, kt & k∗ for some k∗. Clearly k∗ > 0 by Corollary 13.
Thus, k∗ = ¯ k by Corollary 11. This can only occur if kt = ¯ k for all t.H e n c e ,¯ k












t when 0 <λ<1. Thus, the only remaining possibility is for all t suﬃciently
large,
kt+1 <k t+2 < ···< ¯ k.
In this event, kt % ¯ k as well.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows from Lemmas (and Corollaries) 9-16.
Just note that the optimal capital sequence {kt−1} must satisfy the hypotheses
of either Lemma 14 or Lemma 15 (and, hence Lemma 16) and those cases are
mutually exclusive.
34The need for qualifying statements such as eventually nondecreasing or even-
tually increasing is necessary to accommodate special cases of optimal solutions.
The easiest example occurs in the now familiar situation where the economy
starts at ¯ k with k1 = θ1
¡¯ k
¢
< ¯ k.T h eﬁrst period’s stocks decline from the ones
given in the initial condition, but the optimal sequence of capital eventually
increases over time and converge to ¯ k.
6 .Concluding Comments
The monotonicity of the optimal capital sequence is a fundamental property of
the representative agent model. It implies that the shadow prices supporting
the optimal path are also monotonic. In particular, if the capital sequence
is increasing, then capital’s rental price (its marginal product) declines and the
wage rises over time. Bliss (1975, 1999) calls this feature the “Orthodox Vision”
of capital theory. This property is easily seen in the familiar log utility, Cobb-
Douglas production, representative agent example.
The heterogeneous agent extension of this example cannot exhibit the Ortho-
dox Vision as a result of the Le Van and Vailakis (2003) theorem. The twisted
turnpike property in the example implies | f0(xt−1(k) − f0(xt−1(k0) |→ 0 as
t →∞ ,w h e r ef0(x)=ρLx1−ρ is capital’s marginal product. That is, the rental
prices of capital come together from two diﬀerent initial conditions. However,
the sequence of rental prices from a given initial condition are not generally
monotonic as the sequence {f0(xt−1(¯ k)}∞
t=1 fails to be monotonic. However, the
35eventual monotonicity property exhibited along the turnpike shows that even-
tually the Orthodox Vision obtains provided the initial stocks start at or below
¯ k or fall below ¯ k in ﬁnite time. The turnpike’s “twists” occur early over an ini-
tial segment of ﬁnitely many periods before settling down to monotonic capital
accumulation.
36Notes
1The example corresponds to the model in Le Van and Vailakis (2003) with 100 percent
depreciation. The welfare maximization approach to optimal growth was developed in Bewley
(1972), Coles (1985, 1986), Kehoe, (1989), Kehoe and Levine (1985), and Kehoe, Levine and
Romer (1989, 1990).
2Note that they assume each agent’s felicity function is bounded below, whereas the log
felicity assumed here is not. This fact is demonstrated in my log utility example.
3See Becker and Boyd (1997) for more on this interpretation of the planner’s problem.
4See Becker and Boyd (1997), and Boyd (1986, 1990) for the symmetry technique solution
that underlies the example developed below. Other techniques are based on value function
iteration using Bellman’s optimality equation and Howard’s policy improvement algorithm.
5Rader formalized this result for exchange economies in Rader (1971, 1972, and 1981).
The latter paper emphasizes the class of Bernoulli (iso-elastic) one-period return functions,
which include the logartithmic case. A similar result is found in Kehoe (1989) for the two-
person exchange economy when agents have log felicity functions. Capital theoretic versions
are found in Bewley (1982), Coles (1985, 1986), and Le Van and Vailakis (2003).
6The detailed development of this solution is deferred to the next section.
7See Boyd ([8] p.253) as well as the discussion in Section 4 for details.
8See the comments following Proposition 2 in Section 5.
9Recall, they assume that the planner’s felicity function is bounded below.
10See Le Van and Vailakis (2003) for details as well as my arguments for the Convergence
Theorem in the next section.
11See Kamihigashi (2008) for related presentations of Bellman equations in non-stationary
models.
12In fact, it is increasing as the capital stocks are non-zero at each time, so a strict inequality
actually obtains.
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